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THE OAS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: LESSONS
FROM RECENT WEST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
Stephen J. Schnably*
The Organization of American States (OAS) has long been
committed to two fundamental principles not easily reconciled. The
OAS Charter requires member states to adopt "representative
democracy."' Building on earlier resolutions, the General Assembly
declared in the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001 that "[t]he
peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy." 2 Yet the InterAmerican Democratic Charter also requires "due respect for the
principle of non-intervention." 3 Similarly, the OAS Charter gives each
member state the "right to choose, without external interference, 4its
political ... system and to organize itself in the way best suited to it.

In responding to classic military coups against elected
governments since 1991, the OAS has resolved the tension between
democracy and non-intervention in favor of the former. For example,
the OAS condemned a coup in Haiti in 1991 and a military-supported
ouster of Ecuador's President in 2000. 5 Its response has been varied in
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I wish to thank Edgardo Rotman,
Senior Lecturer in International and Comparative Law, and International and Foreign
Librarian, University of Miami, for his excellent assistance in locating documents.
1. Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 3(d), Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 1, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, O.A.S.T.S No. 1-A,
OEA/Ser. A/2(SEPF)Add., by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 66, OEA/Ser.A/41 (SEPF), by the Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 1-E Rev.
OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 (SEPF), and by the Protocol of Managua,
June 10, 1993, 1-F Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), the
integrated
text
reflecting
all
four
amendments
available
at
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ch
arter.html (last visited February 6, 2006) [hereinafter OAS Charter]. See id. pmbl. para. 3.
2. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11,
2001, OAS Doc. OEA/SerP/AGiRes.1 (2001), 28th Spec. Sess., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/
AG?Res.1 (XXVIII-E/01) (OAS General Assembly) (Sept. 11, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1289
(2001) [hereinafter Democratic Charter], available at http://www.oas.org (follow
"Welcome" hyperlink; then follow "Documents & Reports" hyperlink and choose
"Democratic Charter") (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). See Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy,
In Defense of Democracy, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 283 (2004).

3. Democratic Charter, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 1.
4. OAS Charter, supra note 1, art. 3(e).
5. Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutionalism and Democratic Government in the InterAmerican System, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 168-71

(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) [hereinafter Schnably, Constitutionalism];
Support for the Democratic Government of the Constitutional President of the Republic of
Ecuador, OAS Perm. Council Res. OEA/Ser.G CP/RES. 764 (1221/00) (Jan. 26, 2000),
available at http://www.oas.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2005); Support for the Democratic
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more ambiguous situations. The OAS condemned the autogolpes in
Peru in 1992 and Guatemala in 1993, in which civilian presidents
suspended the constitution and other branches of government, but it
reacted passively to Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's subsequent
success in building on the autogolpe to bring into force a new
constitution that greatly increased his powers. 6 It condemned the
attempted removal of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in 2002, in
which he was asserted to have resigned,7 but it remained silent in 2004,
when former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide asserted that he
had not resigned but had been forced out by armed militias and U.S.
duplicity.
Judging when intense political struggle between branches of
government crosses the line into a coup or unconstitutional rupture can
be exceedingly difficult, as can be determining when the military has
coerced apparently voluntary resignations. One way to deal with
ambiguous threats, which are likely to recur, might be to define
democracy more concretely. The Inter-American Democratic Charter
defines democracy to encompass not only free elections and human
rights but also "the rule of law" together with "the separation of powers
and independence of the branches of government." 8 Addressing the
OAS in January 2005, former U.S. President Jimmy Carter listed eight
factors he said could help determine when representative democracy has
been disrupted, such as "[v]iolation of the integrity of central
institutions, including constitutional checks and balances providing for
the separation of powers." 9 The Declaration of Florida, adopted by the
OAS General Assembly in June 2005, presents "full respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, [and] the separation of

Government of the Constitutional President of the Republic of Ecuador, Jamil Mahuad Witt,
and for the Institutions Under the Rule of Law, OAS Perm. Council Res. OEAISer.G
CP/RES. 763 (1220/00) (Jan. 21, 2000), available at http://www.oas.org (last visited Dec.

30, 2005).
6. See Schnably, Constitutionalism,supra note 5, at 171-75.
7. Situation in Venezuela, OAS Perm. Council Res. OEA/Ser.G, CP/RES. 811
(1315/02) (Apr. 13, 2002), available at http://www.oas.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
8. Democratic Charter, supra note 2, art. 1(3).
9. Jimmy Carter, Former President of the United States, The Promise and Peril of
Democracy, Speech at the OAS Inaugural Lecture Series of the Americas (Jan. 25, 2005),
available at http://www.cartercenter.org/doc1995.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005)
(discussing eight conditions of democracy). See Maxwell A. Cameron, Strengthening
Checks and Balances: Democracy Defense and Promotion in the Americas, 10 CANADIAN

FOREIGN POL'Y 101, 101-16 (2003) (discussing five challenges to democracy in Latin
America). See, e.g., Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Protocolon
Democracy and Good Governance, Atdakar, A/SP1/12/01, art. 1 (Dec. 21, 2001)
[hereinafter ECOWAS Good Governance].
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powers and independence of the judiciary" as inextricably bound up
with "democratic institutions."' 0
Any sustained effort to create a regional or transnational
constitutional law would, however, deeply implicate the OAS and

member states in constitutional design and interpretation. What does
"separation of powers" mean in parliamentary systems? Does judicial
independence require judicial review? Do term limits make presidents
too independent? Does constitutional amendment by popular plebiscite
give voice to the will of the people or undermine the rule of law by

subjecting basic structures to the passions of the moment?
Answering these questions concretely on a regional basis would
involve a far greater turn away from non-intervention than the OAS has
undertaken to date. Most recently, the OAS General Assembly declined
to adopt a proposal, reportedly offered by the U.S., to create a

permanent body to monitor democracy in member states. The
monitoring body would have been empowered to hear from labor
unions and civic groups who thought the government was not governing
democratically.11 The OAS General Assembly did, however, instruct
the Secretary General to develop proposals for mechanisms to
"address[] situations that might affect the workings of the political
'2
process of democratic institutions or the legitimate exercise of power.'
The reluctance to accept the initial U.S. proposal cannot be

10. Declaration of Florida, Delivering the Benefits of Democracy pmbl. para. 18,
AG/DEC. 41 (XXXV-0/05) (June 7, 2005) [hereinafter Declaration of Florida].
11. See Joel Brinkley, U.S. Proposal in the O.A.S. Draws Fire as an Attack on
Venezuela, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, § 1, at 10; Joel Brinkley, Latin States Shun U.S. Plan
To Watch Over Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A8. The initial U.S. proposal was
not made public. A subsequent U.S. proposal without the monitoring body asserted that
"governments that do not [govern democratically] should be held accountable," and would
have directed the Secretary General to "propos[e] specific measures to strengthen the
effectiveness and application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter." It also would have
directed the Permanent Council to "develop a process to assess, as appropriate, situations
that may affect the development of a Member State's democratic political institutional
process or the legitimate exercise of power; and to make concrete recommendations, using
the Inter-American Democratic Charter as its guide and with input from civil society, on
how the Permanent Council should address threats to democracy in a timely fashion,
anticipating crises that might undermine democracy." Draft Declaration of FloridaDelivering the Benefits of Democracy, paras. 7, 17, and 18, reprinted in MIAMI HERALD,
June 5, 2005, available at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/l1822010.htn (last
visited Dec. 30, 2005).
12. The final version of the Declaration of Florida adopted by the General Assembly
eliminated the language in the earlier draft about holding governments accountable, made
the instructions to the Secretary General and Permanent Council more general, and added a
reference to nonintervention. Declaration of Florida, supra note 10, pmbl. para., 18, and
paras. 3, 5.
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dismissed as a simple desire by member states to escape scrutiny.
Paradoxically, if the OAS were to try to define democracy in detail, the
very effort would violate the right to democracy. Democracy requires a
high degree of internal domestic choice in the form of government. The
commitment to non-intervention is in part an expression of the right to
democracy.
Perhaps, then, states should be free to adopt any plausibly
democratic constitutional structure, but having done so should be
required to respect that structure, including rules governing change.
The OAS's emphasis on responding to interruptions of constitutional
government might be explained as an attempt to ensure constitutional
fidelity.
In 1991, it promised to respond immediately to "any
occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the
democratic political institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of
13
power by the democratically elected government" of an OAS member.
The Protocol of Washington, which amended the OAS Charter,
provides for suspension of a state "whose democratically constituted
government has been overthrown by force.' 14 The Inter-American
Democratic Charter commits the OAS to respond to "an
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously
impairs the democratic order in a member state."' 15 The Declaration of
Florida envisions the possibility of an OAS mechanism to "address[]
situations that might affect the workings of the political process of
'6
democratic institutions or the legitimate exercise of power.,'
Other organizations have similar commitments. MERCOSUR, a
free trade association among several South American nations, agreed in
1996 to respond to any "interruption in the democratic order" of its
members or associates.' 7 The Organization of African Unity formally
bound itself in 2000 to protect democracy against "unconstitutional
changes of government."' 8 The Economic Community of West African
13. Representative Democracy, para. 1, OEA/Ser.P, OAS Doc. AG/RES. 1080 (XXI0/91) (June 5, 1991).
14. Texts Approved by the General Assembly at its Sixteenth Special Session in
Connection with the Amendments to the Charter of the Organization, OEA/Ser.P, OAS Doc.
AG/doc. 11 (XVI-E/92) (1992) (Article 8 bis) (Article 9 of the amended Charter).
15. Democratic Charter, supra note 2, art. 19. See id. art. 20.
16. Declaration of Florida, supra note 10, para. 3.
17. Protocolo de Ushuaia Sobre Compromiso Democrdtico en el Mercosur, la
Repfiblica
de
Bolivia
y
la
Repdiblica
de
Chile,
http://www.mercosur.org.uy/espano/snor/varios/protocoloushuaia.htm

art.
4
(1996),
(last visited Dec.

30, 2005).
18. Declaration on the Framework for an Organization of African Unity (OAU),
Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, 36th Sess. of the Assembly of Heads
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States (ECOWAS) agreed in 2001 to respond to situations where
"democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means" in member
states. 19
Emphasis on constitutional fidelity does less to resolve the paradox
than one might hope, for the practice of responding to coups or other
interruptions in democratic government requires surprisingly intrusive
and contestable interpretations of other countries' constitutions. A
recent example from the West African Republic of Togo vividly
illustrates this problem-and suggests that it may be common to any
regional effort to protect constitutional democracy.
Gnassingb6 Eyad6ma, Togo's President since 1967, died on
February 5, 2005.20 Within hours the military declared his son Faur6
Gnassingb6 the new President. Article 65 of Togo's Constitution,
however, provided that if the President died the Speaker of the
legislature-the President of the National Assembly-was to exercise
the functions of the presidency for sixty days, at which time an election
would be held. 2 ' In Paris when the President died, the Speaker
subsequently
asserted from Benin that he was the true constitutional
22
successor.

ECOWAS called Faur6 Gnassingb6's accession a "violation of the
[Togolese] Constitution. 2 3 The African Union (AU) deemed it "a
blatant and unacceptable violation of the Togolese Constitution. 2 4 The

of State and Government, Lom&, OAU Doc. AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) (July 10-12, 2000),
available at http://www.africa-union.org (follow the "Welcome" hyperlink; then follow the
"Special Programs" hyperlink to the "The Conference on Security, Stability Development
and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA)" hyperlink and choose the title of the cited
declaration) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
19. See ECOWAS Good Governance, supra note 9, art. 45; see also Declaration of
Political Principles of the Economic Community of West African States, 14th Sess. of the
Authority of Heads of States and Government, Abuja, ECOWAS Doc. A/DCL. 1/7/91 (July
4-6, 1991).
20. GnassingbeEyadema, 69, Togo Ruler, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at B8. See
Lydia Polgreen, Ruling Dynasty Seems to Start, Leaving Many in Togo Resentful, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2005, at Al1.
21. TOGO CONST. art. 65, reprintedin XVIII CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE

WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz & Patricie H. Ward eds., 2004) [hereinafter Togo Const.].
22. Fambar6 Natchaba Veut Toujours Assurer l'interim au Togo [Fambar6 Natchaba
claims

leadership

in Togo],

article in

L'ACTUALITt

Du TOGO,

Feb. 28,

2005,

http://www.izf.net/izf/index.htm (follow "Actualit6" hyperlink; then follow "Togo"
hyperlink and search for the date of article cited) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
23. Press Release, ECOWAS Salutes the Memory of President Eyadema, Condemns
the Violation of the Constitution and Calls for a Return to Constitutional Order (Feb. 5,
2005); Communique, ECOWAS, On the Situation in Togo, Cotonou (Feb. 11, 2005).
24. Communiqu6 of the Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the African Union, Peace and
Security Council (Part B), On the Situation in Togo, AU PSC/PR/Comm. (XXIV), Addis

Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 33:263

U.N. Secretary General said the transfer of power had "not been done in
25

full respect of the provisions of the Constitution.

The U.S. State

26

Department called it "an unconstitutional move.
France, Togo's
27
former colonial ruler, took the same position.
Was the accession of Gnassingb6 Eyad~ma's son constitutional?
At first the government rested its defense of his accession on a
sweeping claim of inherent power in a national emergency. The military
asserted that the speaker's absence from the country at the moment the

president died created a power vacuum that called for swift action to
ensure stability and security. The military undercut its argument,
however, by announcing the suspension of the constitution and closing
the country's borders, preventing the Speaker's return. 8
The government soon presented a constitutional case less easily
dismissed. On February 6, the Togolese legislature elected Faur6

Eyad~ma its new speaker. By unanimous vote it also exercised its
power under Article 144 to amend the constitution with the concurrence

of at least four-fifths of the members, changing Article 65 to allow the
son to serve out the remainder of his father's term.29 Faur6 Gnassingb6
Ababa, Ethiopia (Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Communiqu6, On the Situation in Togo].
25. Press Release, U.N., Secretary-General Concerned Togo's Power Transfer Not
Done 'In Full Respect' of Constitution, U.N. Doc. SB/SM971 1, AFR/ 1106 (Feb. 7, 2005).
26. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, Background Note: Togo,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5430.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE].

27. France Insists on Respect for Togo's Constitution, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY
(PANA) DAILY NEWSWIRE, Feb. 7, 2005. See also Francophonie Threatens Togo with
Suspension, PANA DAILY NEWSWIRE, Feb. 8, 2005 (criticism from Francophonie

Parliamentary Assembly regarding the violation of the Togolese constitution).
28. Togo: Military Suspend Constitution, Eyadema's Son Takes Power, INTEGRATED
REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORKS (IRIN NEWS), Feb. 5, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org

(follow "West Africa" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for date of
article) (last visted Dec. 30, 2005). See also Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Post-Eyadema
Togo-A Military Coup or Unconstitutional Government? DIASTODE (Feb. 2005),
http://www.diastode.org/Nouvelles/usnews235.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005); Togo Sees
Sense, ACCRA MAIL, reprintedin AFR. NEWS, Feb. 22, 2005 [hereinafter Togo Sees Sense],

http://lexis-nexis.com (follow "News & Business," "By Country & Region," "Middle East
& Africa" hyperlinks, then choose "Africa News" database and search title and date of
article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
29. Loi No. 2005-002 de 6 Fevrier 2005 portant modification des articles 65 et 144 de
la Constitution [Law No. 2005-002 of Feb. 6, 2005 amending articles 65 and 144 of the
Constitution], reprinted in J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE TOGOALISE, NUMERO SPECIAL,

Feb. 6, 2005 [hereinafter Loi No. 2005-002] (amending art. 65 to provide, "Le nouveau
Pr6sident de la R6publique exerce ses fontions jusqu'au terme du mandate de son
pred6c6sseur" ["The new President of the Republic will perform his duties until the end of
his predecessor's term."]. See also Togo: La Regime de Faure Gnassingbe Sanctionne
[Togo: Faur6 Gnassingb6's Regime Sanctioned], BBC AFRIQUE.COM, Feb. 20, 2005
[hereinafter

BBC

AFRIQUE.COM,

Togo],
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was sworn in the next day. These after-the-fact changes were not
entirely unlike Peru's retroactive regularization of the autogolpe
through the promulgation of a new constitution by a relatively
powerless constituent assembly in 1992 and 1993.
ECOWAS condemned the "illegal amendment" of the
constitution, 3 ° calling it nothing more than pure and simple
"manipulations of the Constitution by the National Assembly"-a
"cover-up" for a "coup d'etat.'
It proceeded to impose sanctions.3 2
The AU "firmly condemn[ed] the revision of the Togolese Constitution
made by the de facto authorities, in violation of the relevant provisions
of the Togolese Constitution,, 33 and suspended Togo's participation in
the AU.34
To assert that constitutional amendments are unconstitutional is to
venture into interpretive territory more often explored by scholars than
by regional political bodies. To be sure, there was ample ground in
Article 144 to question the amendments' validity. Article 144 provides
that amendments may not be adopted when the presidency is vacant.35
(It also prohibits amendments that would revise the "Republican form

http://www.bbc.co.uk/french/highlights/story/2005/02/050220_togosanctions.shtml
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2005); Vacance du Pouvoir: Les Dputs Votent la R~vision de la
Constitution [Vacant Powers: Members of Parliament vote on the revision of the
Constitution], article in L'ACTUALITE Du TOGO (Feb. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Vacance du
Pouvoir], http://www.izf.net/izf/index.htm (follow "Actualit6" hyperlink; then follow
"Togo" hyperlink and search for the date of article cited) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
30. Press Release, ECOWAS Holds Extraordinary Meeting on the Situation in Togo
(Feb. 8, 2005). "In violation of the Togolese Constitution, following its illegal amendment,
Faure Gnassingb6, son of the late president, was designated to succeed his father." Id.
31. Final Communiqu&, ECOWAS, Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and
Government, Niamey (Feb. 9, 2005), para. 5.
32. Id. para. 6; see also Communiqu& Issued by the Current Chairman ECOWAS
(Mamadou Tandja, President of the Republic of Niger and Chairman of the Authority of
Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS) (Feb. 18, 2005).
33. Communiqu6, On the Situation in Togo, supra note 24.
34. Communiqu6 of the Twenty-Fifth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union Peace and Security/Permanent Representatives/Committee
(AU
PSC/PR/Comm.) XXV (Feb. 25 2005); see Press Release No. 02/2005, Addis Ababa, (Feb.
19,
2005),
available
at
www.africa-union.org/NewsEvents/
PressReleases/19%202005%2OTogo%20-%20%20eng.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2005)
(statement by Alpha Oumar Konar6, Chairperson, Commission of the African Union, that
Faur& Gnassingb6's continuation as President, even pending elections would violate the
Togolese Constitution); see also Communiqu6 of the Thirtieth Meeting of the Peace and
Security Council of the AU PSC/PR/Comm. XXX, Addis Ababa, Ethopia (May 27, 2005)
(the AU sanctions were eventually lifted after the presidential election conducted under
ECOWAS auspices in April 2005).
35. Togo Const., supra note 21, art. 144.
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of the State.") 36 The presidency may well have been vacant on
February 6, when the legislature adopted the amendments. The
military's initial recognition of Gnassingb6 Eyad6ma's son as President
was questionable, to say the least, and his election as Speaker would not
clearly have made him President as opposed to simply entitling him to
exercise presidential powers pending elections.
As U.S. constitutional scholars have pondered whether Article V's
own amendment procedures could be employed to eliminate its
prohibition against depriving a U.S. state of equal suffrage in the Senate
without its consent, 37 so too did the Togolese legislature recognize that a
constitutional limitation on the amendment power might itself be
amended out of existence. Thus at the same time it elected Gnassingb6
Eyad6ma's son as Speaker and amended Article 65, the Togolese
legislature also amended Article 144 to remove the prohibition of
38
constitutional amendments when the presidency was vacant.
ECOWAS and the AU were unmoved, and their steadfastness
pressured Togo to back down. On February 21, the National Assembly
amended the constitution yet again to provide for elections within sixty
days, essentially reversing the previous amendments. 39 Four days later
Faur6 Gnassingb6 resigned, paving the way for a new Speaker and
Interim President, Abass Bonfoh.4 °
There is much to be said for a judgment that something other than
the spirit of democracy infused Togo's hasty constitutional revisions.
What is striking, however, is that the condemnations were expressed so
strongly in constitutional terms, given the potential complexity of the
legal argument. Similar complexities arose in the conduct of the
36. Id.
37. U.S. Const. art. V. See, e.g., Scott J. Bowman, Note, Wild Political Dreaming:
ConstitutionalReformation of the United States Senate, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 1017 (2004).

38. Loi No. 2005-002, supra note 29 (removing reference to vacancy of the
presidency); see BBC AFRIQUE.COM, Togo, supra note 29; see also Vacance du Pouvoir,
supra note 29.
39. Loi No. 2005-006 de 24 F6vrier 2005 modifiant les articles 65 et 144 de la
Constitution [Law No. 2005-006 of Feb. 24, 2005 amending articles 65 and 144 of the
Constitution], reprinted in J. OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE TOGOLAISE, NUMERO SPECIAL,
Feb. 24, 2005 (restoring the Togolese Constitution, arts. 65 and 144, to its former text).
40. Lydia Polgreen, Togo Ruler, Succumbing to Pressure, Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2005, at A6; see Togo Sees Sense, supra note 28; Press Release, ECOWAS, Faure
Gnassingbe
Steps
Down,
ECOWAS
Lifts
Sanctions
(Feb.
26, 2005),
http://www.sec.ecowas; Emmanuel Goujon, Nouvelle Rdforme Constitutionnelle Que Ne
Change Rien au Fond [New Constitutional Reform Which Ultimately Changes Nothing],
article in L'ACTUALITI DU TOGO, Feb. 21, 2005, http://www.izf.net/izf/index.htm (follow

"Actualit6" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for the date of article cited)
(last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
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presidential election that followed, and in each case ECOWAS and
other international actors showed little hesitancy in interpreting the
Constitution.
One issue related to the timing of the election. On February 28,
2005, shortly after Faur&Gnassingb& had resigned, ECOWAS met with
the government and opposition parties and announced that "transparent,
free and fair elections" for President would need to be held "within 60
days as required by the Constitution of Togo.

41

Sixty days after

Gnassingb6 Eyad6ma died would have been April 6, 2005, but
ECOWAS declared two days later that "the 60 days Interim period
prescribed by the Constitution of Togo in article 65 shall be deemed to
have started on the 26th February, 2005 with the coming into office of
Mr. Abass Bonfoh as Interim President., 42 In dating the vacancy in
relation to the resignation of Faur&Gnassingb6, rather than in relation to
the death of his father, Gnassingb6 Eyad6ma, ECOWAS might appear
to have contradicted its view that Faur6 Gnassingb6 had never
legitimately occupied the office in the first place. On the other hand,
opposition parties claimed that holding an election quickly after years of
dictatorship would give them insufficient time to organize, 43 and the
slightly later date did provide somewhat more time to prepare for the
election.
A second issue related to eligibility. Long-time opposition leader
Gilchrist Olympio, son of Togo's first president (who had been
assassinated in 1963), had been in exile in France since 1992, when
government forces nearly assassinated him.44 In 2002, Parliamentdominated then as in February 2005 by the ruling party-amended the
Constitution to prohibit the candidacy of anyone who "does not reside
in the national territory for at least twelve (12) months. 4 5 Olympio was
thereby eliminated as a candidate in the 2003 presidential election.
Nearly two years later, Faur& Gnassingb-whom ECOWAS had just
thwarted from what it deemed an attempted coup d'etat--qualified as a
41. Togo: Government and Opposition Agree on Major Contentious ElectoralIssues,
(Feb. 28, 2005), availableat http://www.lome.com.
42. Press Release, ECOWAS Calls for Commencement of Progress Towards Holding
Presidential Elections (Mar. 2, 2005); see also Togolese Political[Leaders] Sign Agreement
on Upcoming Presidential Polls, BBC, Mar. 30, 2005 (text of agreement signed
government, opposition parties, and ECOWAS concerning April 24 election).
43. See Togo: Clashes Break Out as People Complain of Being Denied Voters' Cards
for Presidential Poll, IRIN NEWS, Apr. 1, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West
Africa" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for date of article) (last visted
Dec. 30, 2005).
44. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 26.
45. Id.
WORLD NEWS NETWORK, LOME,
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candidate in the April 2005 election, while Olympio was again barred
from running. (With Olympio's endorsement the opposition nominated

instead Emmanuel Bob-Akitani, widely viewed as a stand-in for
Olympio.)46

On April 26, 2005, Togo's electoral commission reported Faur6
Gnassingb& the winner with sixty percent of the vote, with Bob-Akitani
receiving thirty-eight percent. Claiming that the election was tainted by
ballot fraud, restrictions on the press, and insufficient time to organize,
opposition figures publicly rejected the outcome.4 7 ECOWAS, which
had sent 150 observers shortly before the election, pronounced the
election in accord with international standards.4 8 The U.S. expressed
serious concerns about the fairness of the election. 49 There were signs

46. See, e.g., Togo: Opposition Callsfor Postponement of PresidentialElection, IRIN
NEWS, Mar. 28, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West Africa" hyperlink; then
follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
47. On April 27, Emmanuel Bob-Akitani declared himself the president of Togo and
called on supporters to "fight with our lives if necessary." Togo: Poll Chaos Spreads,
Hundreds Flee, Opposition Leader DeclaresHimself President,IRIN NEWS, Apr. 27, 2005,
http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West Africa" hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink
and search for date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). ECOWAS's Executive Secretary
quickly rejected the declaration, deeming it "very similar to action of the military in
declaring a successor for President Eyadema," and called on all parties to "work within the
Constitution and the law of the country." Togo: Togo's Opposition Candidate DeclaresSelf
President,THIS DAY, reprintedin AFR.NEWS, Apr. 28, 2005, http://lexis-nexis.com (follow
"News & Business," "By Country & Region," "Middle East & Africa" hyperlinks, then
choose "Africa News" database and search title and date of article) (last visited Dec. 30,
2005). The U.S. condemned what it deemed "calls for violent protests." U.S. Condemns
Violence in Togo, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 28, 2005 (remarks of U.S. State
Dep't spokesperson, Adam Ereli), http://lexis-nexis.com (follow "News & Business," "By
Country & Region," "Middle East & Africa" hyperlinks, then choose "Xinhua General
News Service" database and search title and date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005)
[hereinafter U.S. Condemns Violence in Togo]; see also Togo; IFJ Condemns 'Media
Blockade' in Togo Ahead of Presidential Elections, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF
JOURNALISTS, reprintedin AFR.NEWS, Apr. 22, 2005, http://lexis-nexis.com (follow "News

& Business," "By Country & Region," "Middle East & Africa" hyperlinks, then choose
"Africa News" database and search title and date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
48. See U.S. Condemns Violence in Togo, supra note 47. For one analysis of
ECOWAS's stance, see Election 2005: Twenty-Two Dead So Far as Togo Post-Poll
Violence Escalates,WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Apr. 28, 2005.
49. See U.S. Challenges Election Results in Togo, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY (PANA)
DAILY NEWSWIRE, Apr. 28, 2005; Togo: Diplomatic Documents Surface Citing Fraud in

April Poll, IRIN NEWS, May 6, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West Africa"
hyperlink; then follow "Togo" hyperlink and search for date of article) (last visited Dec. 30,
2005) (citing European Union briefing papers which reported nearly a million phantom
voters); Togo's Human Rights Leader Queries ECOWAS Monitors Over Togo, PANA
DAILY NEWSWIRE, May 6, 2005, http://papapress.com (follow "Togo," then search for date
of article) (reporting criticism from the Togolese League of Human Rights (LTDH) over
what it termed ECOWAS's failure to acknowledge massive vote fraud).
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of a systematic and brutal crackdown on dissent by the Togolese
military; reports indicated that hundreds of people were killed and tens
of thousands fled Togo.50 Faur6 Gnassingb6 was sworn in as the new
president on May 4, 2005.51
The positions ECOWAS took on Togo's Constitution in
overseeing the election raise interesting questions. If the amendments
that would have validated Faur6 Gnassingb&'s assumption of the
presidency in February 2005 amounted to no more than invalid
manipulations of the constitution, should the same be said for the ruling
party's adoption of the residency requirement in 2002, apparently to
exclude an exiled opposition leader from running for office? What
legitimate leeway might there be in interpreting and applying a
constitutional mandate for a quick election to fill a vacancy in a country
that had not held a free or fair elections for decades?
More generally, how should such questions be approached? In
dealing with the exclusion of former Guatemalan Dictator Rios Montt
from running for President, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights once suggested that there was a "customary constitutional rule
with a strong tradition in Central America" excluding coup d'etat
participants from running for President.5 2 Would ECOWAS have been
justified in finding or asserting a similar rule of transnational
constitutional law in West Africa, perhaps using it as a basis for
interpreting Article 58 of the Togolese Constitution (stating that the
President is to be "the guarantor of. .. the institutions of the Republic")
to exclude a former coup participant from running? Using regional
50. See Togo: Human Rights Group Says 790 Killed in Election Violence, IRIN NEWS,
May 13, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org (follow "West Africa" hyperlink; then follow
"Togo" hyperlink and search for date of article) (last visted Dec. 30, 2005) (noting the
estimate of 100 dead by the government and 790 dead by LTDH estimates). The office of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that over 35,000 refugees
fled Togo in the aftermath of the election. See Press Briefing, UNHCR, Togo: Over 3,000
Fled to Benin and Ghana in June, (July 1, 2005) (noting total of 38,492 refugees),
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgibintexis/vtx/news/opendoc.htm?tbl=NEWS&page=home&id=42c515fc 1 (last visited Dec.
30, 2005); see also Press Release, U.N. Human Rights High Commissioner to Send Mission
to Togo to Assess Allegations of Violations Linked to Elections, U.N. Doc. HR/4855 (June
10, 2005), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/hr8455.doc.htm (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
51. Faure Gnassingb Sworn in as Togo's New President, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS
SERVICE, May 4, 2005, http://lexis-nexis.com (follow "News & Business," "By Country &
Region," "Middle East & Africa" hyperlinks, then choose "Xinhua General News Service"
database and search title and date of article) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
52. Rios Montt v. Guatemala, Case No. 10,804, Int.-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 30/93,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79 rev. 1, doc. 12, 22,
29, 38 (1993); see Schnably, Constitutionalism,
supra note 5, at 185-86.
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customary law would have been an assertive though not entirely
implausible approach to interpreting the Constitution.
Alternatively, one could understand ECOWAS's approach in terms
of constitutional fidelity. Perhaps it reflected a judgment that adherence
to a constitutional text in a fairly literal manner, with little regard for its
origins and context, is the best route over the long run to a creating a
strong constitutional underpinning to democracy. The prospect of
credible pressure by international bodies to adhere to the terms of the
text might lend attractiveness to this vision of constitutional fidelity.
Granted, the immediate outcome-installation of the late President's
son after an election widely regarded as tainted by fraud and enforced
by systematic violence-gives little sign of any advance towards
democracy. But that outcome does not in itself settle the longer-run
question of constitutionalism and democracy.
Contrast the vigor of the constitutional interpretation displayed in
the West African regional response to Togo's succession crisis,
notwithstanding fundamental ambiguities in both interpretation and
method, with the regional response in the Americas to one of Ecuador's
frequent constitutional upheavals some years earlier. In 1997, the
Ecuadorian Congress removed the widely unpopular President Abdald
Bucaram. Instead of impeaching him under Article 82(g) of the
Constitution, Congress removed him under Article 100 for "mental
incapacity." With a show of institutional assertiveness echoing
Fujimori's actions in Peru in 1992, the Ecuadorian Congress also
removed the Attorney General, the Comptroller, and members of the
Constitutional Court. Bucaram may have earned (indeed courted) the
nickname "El Loco," but there was little question that Congress simply
made a strategic and contestable choice to use the simpler of the two
routes to remove him. Refusing to accept the legality of his removal,
Bucaram called Congress' action an "attempted coup." Neither the OAS
nor any member states took an official position on the constitutionality
of Bucaram's removal or the competing claims of succession put forth
by the Vice-President and the Head of Congress. One U.S. official was
quoted as saying that "the law is ambiguous.... It's not for us to tell
53
the Ecuadorian people how they should interpret their Constitution.,
The Ecuadorian military resolved the struggle by withdrawing
recognition of Bucaram and pressing civilian leaders to settle on a
successor.
The Inter-American Democratic Charter was adopted four years
53. Andres Oppenheimer, Democracies Stay Out of Ecuador Controversy, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 8, 1997, at 20A; see Schnably, Constitutionalism,supra note 5, at 178-80.
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later in 2001. In April 2005, Ecuador's Congress removed yet another
president (one of four from 1997 to date), finding pursuant to Article
167(6) of the Ecuadorian Constitution that he had abandoned his posta conclusion he disputed until the military announced it would no longer
recognize him.54 Even as the OAS General Assembly met in June 2005
amidst calls for more vigorous enforcement of the Charter's
endorsement of the separation of powers, independence of the judiciary,
and the rule of law, Bolivia experienced a crisis of succession. Its
President and both the first and second in line to succeed him resigned
in the face of widespread protests.55
Claims by the U.S. government and some non-governmental
organizations that crises like these should meet with a more active OAS
response in light of the adoption of the Charter appear to assume that
the modesty displayed in the regional response to Ecuador's
constitutional crisis in 1997 should now be discarded.56 As the more
assertive approach to constitutional interpretation displayed in the
regional response to Togo's crisis makes clear, however, the blend of
complexity and impact so distinctive to constitutional controversies cuts
both ways. Governments' interpretations of their own constitutions are
typically marked by a heavy dose of domestic self-interest; the events in
Togo in February 2005 may show that some regional constraint on the
process could be desirable. But those events, and the questions
ECOWAS faced in overseeing the elections, also show how deeply
international or regional organizations can be drawn into reasonably
contestable issues of constitutional interpretation. And however marked
by self-interest a government's interpretation of its own constitution
may be, it would be unwise to assume that states' interpretations of
other countries' constitutions will be free of their own foreign policy
self-interest.
The U.S. government's initial position (quickly
withdrawn) that Chavez's apparent departure in the events of April

54. See 'Constitutional Coup' by Congress Ousts Gutierrez on Wave of Popular
Protests, LATIN AMERICAN WEEKLY REPORT, Apr. 26, 2005.

55. See Juan Forero, Bolivia Installs New Leader With Very Long 'To Do' List, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2005, at A7.

56. This is not to say that prior to the Charter, member states never took the occasion to
pronounce on the proper interpretation of other countries' constitutions. The U.S., for
example, took a very firm stance on a contestable point of interpretation of Haiti's
Constitution when it returned Aristide to power in 1994, requiring him to accept that his first
term would end in 1996, five years after he had been sworn in, even though a military coup
had prevented him from serving most of his term. Schnably, Constitutionalism,supra note
5, at 190-91. However, it seems plausible that the Charter's references to constitutional
concepts like the separation of powers, together with recent calls for the OAS to hold
governments accountable for governing democratically, will produce more such occasions.
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2002 represented the constitutionally valid resignation of an autocrat
who needed to learn to "respect constitutional processes" was surely not
unrelated to its hostility to his political positions and rhetoric. 57 It is
equally hard to imagine that the U.S. initiative in the June 2005 OAS
meeting was entirely unrelated to its consistent hostility to Chavez, even
though the proposal cannot be dismissed simply as another diplomatic
maneuver against a government not in favor with the U.S. If states and
regional bodies become more deeply involved in interpreting other
countries' constitutions, there is a danger that they will have a new and
substantially more intrusive means of pursuing their own foreign policy
aims.
In short, whether it takes the form of transnational constitutional
law or an emphasis on constitutional fidelity, a practice of regional
interpretation of constitutions presents dangers as well as benefits. A
keen appreciation of both is an essential guide to any further
development of the OAS's new involvement in constitutionalism.

57. See Meet the Press: Condoleezza Rice Discusses the Situation in the Middle East
and the Venezuelan Presidential Crisis (NBC television broadcast Apr. 14, 2002),
(transcript available at LexisNexis); Press Statement, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Venezuela:
Change of Government (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9316.html
(last visited Dec. 30, 2005).

